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Since its first description four decades ago, attachment theory (AT) has become one
of the principal developmental psychological frameworks for describing the role of
individual differences in the establishment and maintenance of social bonds between
people. Yet, still little is known about the neurobiological underpinnings of attachment
orientations and their well-established impact on a range of social and affective
behaviors. In the present review, we summarize data from recent studies using
cognitive and imaging approaches to characterize attachment styles and their effect on
emotion and social cognition. We propose a functional neuroanatomical framework to
integrate the key brain mechanisms involved in the perception and regulation of social
emotional information, and their modulation by individual differences in terms of secure
versus insecure (more specifically avoidant, anxious, or resolved versus unresolved)
attachment traits. This framework describes how each individual’s attachment style (built
through interactions between personal relationship history and predispositions) may
influence the encoding of approach versus aversion tendencies (safety versus threat)
in social encounters, implicating the activation of a network of subcortical (amygdala,
hippocampus, striatum) and cortical (insula, cingulate) limbic areas. These basic and
automatic affective evaluation mechanisms are in turn modulated by more elaborate
and voluntary cognitive control processes, subserving mental state attribution and
emotion regulation capacities, implicating a distinct network in medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), among
others. Recent neuroimaging data suggest that affective evaluation is decreased in
avoidantly but increased in anxiously attached individuals. In turn, although data on
cognitive control is still scarce, it points toward a possible enhancement of mental state
representations associated with attachment insecurity and particularly anxiety. Emotion
regulation strategies such as reappraisal or suppression of social emotions are also
differentially modulated by attachment style. This research does not only help better
understand the neural underpinnings of human social behavior, but also provides important
insights on psychopathological conditions where attachment dysregulation is likely to play
an important (causal) role.
Keywords: adult attachment style, functional neuroanatomical framework, human social interactions, cognitive
affective neuroscience, emotional versus cognitive mentalization
INTRODUCTION
In mammals, including humans, attachment is a major dimen-
sion of behavior that can come into play in several domains
(Fisher et al., 2006). This includes bond formation and main-
tenance between children and parents (parental care), love and
sexual fidelity between long-term partners (partner attachment),
but also various social links between individuals in a group.
How much people value and react to interactions with others is
undoubtedly a major ingredient of human life and emotions. In
recent years, important progresses have been achieved by neuro-
science research concerning the brain circuits involved in basic
sexual and parental bonding (Insel and Young, 2001), as well
as the close functional interactions between social and emo-
tional/motivational systems in the brain (Lieberman, 2007), but
the neural processes subserving affective attachment of humans
to others in various conditions still remain to be elucidated.
The notion of attachment is a central feature of a prominent
theoretical framework of social-emotional behavior in develop-
mental psychology, known as attachment theory (AT) (Bowlby,
1969, 1982). This framework relies on the assumption that every
human being is born with an innate attachment system, whose
biological function is to obtain or maintain proximity to signif-
icant others in times of need or presence of threats, and thus
to regulate support seeking behavior. Such a function is crucial
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for survival in early life, as a child cannot live on its own with-
out the care of his/her primary attachment figure—mainly the
mother. This is especially vital in mammals, as the mother is the
main resource for food, and even more so in humans, because
the time span during which an offspring is dependent on external
care is particularly long. Importantly, however, AT suggests that
repeated interactions with attachment figures (e.g., parents), and
the responses of the latter to the proximity seeking attempts of the
child, will induce the formation of differential cognitive schemes
for representing the self and others, and for behaving in interper-
sonal relationships later on in life. These processes are thought to
lead to the establishment of so-called internal working models of
attachment (IWMs), encoding expectations of care and allowing
a “mental simulation and prediction of likely outcomes of various
attachment behaviors” (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007) when inter-
acting with significant social partners. This will then constitute
the foundation of a person’s individual attachment style, which
remains fairly stable into adulthood and may provide a template
for determining how people perceive and react during various
types of social encounters. Thus, although adult attachment style
(AAS) may influence response patterns during close relationships
with other individuals (e.g., romantic partners), it is consid-
ered to also operate during interactions or social appraisals with
unknown people, as well as during a range of different emotional
situations throughout life (Niedenthal et al., 2002; Fraley et al.,
2006; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). The impact of individual dif-
ferences in AAS on social and affective functioning is therefore
thought to go far beyond the specific behaviors associated with
parental and partner attachment (Fisher et al., 2006).
Although very prominent in developmental psychology
(Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007) and some psychopathological the-
ories (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009), the social-affective phenomena
associated with attachment style as well as their impact on human
behaviors and their neural mechanisms have only rarely been
investigated in a human neuroscience perspective. The current
review therefore aims at providing an overview of recent investi-
gations that combined an AT perspective with cognitive and neu-
robiological approaches. Doing so may offer novel and promising
avenues for future research, not only to better understand normal
social behaviors in humans, including individual differences in
AAS; but also to illuminate some conditions or pathologies asso-
ciated with disturbances in social emotional functioning, such as
autism (Andari et al., 2010), schizophrenia (Abdi and Sharma,
2004; Marwick and Hall, 2008), borderline personality (Fonagy
and Luyten, 2009; Fonagy et al., 2011), or violence and sociopathy
(Decety et al., 2009; Blair et al., 2011a,b). In this review, we will
first introduce the general theoretical aspects of AT and discuss
how itmay offer a fruitful framework in social cognitive and affec-
tive neuroscience. We will then mainly focus on the functional
neurobiological mechanisms of social and affective processing
that may underlie individual differences in attachment style.
ATTACHMENT THEORY
Distinct individual profiles in attachment style have been
described and can be identified in adults by specific
questionnaires or semi-structured interviews (see Mikulincer
and Shaver, 2007 for an overview). In the case of an available
and responding attachment figure providing a “secure base”
for restoring emotional balance in times of distress, a positive
model of others linked with supportiveness and trustworthiness
can be developed, paired with positive self-attributes such as
worthy, competent, and lovable. This allows the formation of a
secure attachment style. In contrast, an insecure attachment style
will emerge if attachment figures are repeatedly experienced as
unresponsive or inconsistent in their responses in times of need
and stress. Two major patterns of insecurity have been classically
distinguished: either avoidant or anxious attachment, associated
with the establishment of attachment system de-activation or
hyper-activation as secondary attachment strategies, respectively,
(Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).
In the case of attachment avoidance, proximity seeking is
perceived as futile or even dangerous because of the distress
felt by failing to achieve proximity to an attachment fig-
ure. Consequently, avoidant individuals develop a dismissive
approach to and a negative model of others, operating through
the denial of positive traits in others. They disavow needs for
attachment, avoid affective closeness and intimacy, but seek inde-
pendence with the goal to prevent the felt rejection by others.
Concomitantly, they tend to suppress negative aspects of the self
and boost their positive features instead, leading to the emer-
gence of a positive self-model. In addition, attachment avoidance
is associated with a preferential use of (expressive) suppression
to regulate emotions (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007), allowing the
individual to keep the attachment system in a low activation state
and to prevent others of perceiving their internal emotional states
(Vrticka et al., 2012a).
The other main form of insecurity is attachment anxiety, where
a perceived failure to handle threats autonomously will encour-
age subjects to intensify their support-seeking attempts despite
the fact that attachment figures are experienced as inconsistent.
In this case, others are still viewed as (partly) positive due to the
desire for attention and protection. However, repeated experience
of rejection leads to an increased sense of helplessness and vulner-
ability, paired with doubts about self-worth and -efficacy, leading
to a negative internal model of the self and poor self-esteem.
Such individuals become highly vigilant to potential threats and
rejections. This style is also thought to imply a distinctive emo-
tion regulation strategy, with preferential use of re-appraisal but
in the “wrong” direction: instead of decreasing the impact of
negative emotions, these subjects actually tend to intensify the
impact of negative social signals due to their hypersensitivity
to the latter (Bartholomew, 1990; Bartholomew and Horowitz,
1991; Griffin and Bartholomew, 1994; Mikulincer and Shaver,
2007).
Besides these three main categories of secure, avoidant,
and anxious attachment styles, a fourth attachment orienta-
tion has been proposed, referred to as fearful or disorganized
(Main et al., 1985; Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991; Griffin
and Bartholomew, 1994; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). It is
either characterized by the presence of both avoidant and
anxious attachment traits, reflecting negative models for both
the self and others, or by disoriented attachment behaviors
indicating the lack of a coherent attachment strategy. The lat-
ter type is also called unresolved attachment, in contrast to
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the resolved/organized attachment orientations corresponding
to the secure, avoidant, or anxious styles. Such a dissociation
between resolved versus unresolved attachment categories is par-
ticularly prominent in psychopathology research, where it has
been proposed that attachment dysregulations in terms of an
unresolved attachment orientation might lay at the core of some
emotional disturbances, including borderline personality disor-
der (BPD; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009), as well as schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression (Berry et al.,
2007).
On the ground of such descriptions of secure and insecure
AAS, Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) have proposed that an exten-
sive list of human social behaviors might be importantly modu-
lated by these psychological traits. This includes (1) romantic and
sexual behavior, (2) self-regulation and personal growth, (3) emo-
tion regulation and coping, (4) interpersonal regulation, as well
as (5) family functioning and parental care. In addition, AAS may
also influence more general behaviors related to affect and moti-
vation, including pain and medical care (Meredith et al., 2006;
Hooper et al., 2012). Thus, attachment dysregulations are nowa-
days recognized as important contributors to various emotional
and social disturbances, a fact which bolsters the need of bet-
ter understanding their cognitive underpinnings as well as their
neural substrates.
However, the current distinction of AAS into three, four,
or even five main categories has been questioned by some
researchers who proposed instead to conceive these individ-
ual differences along a single continuum of emotional security
(e.g., Fraley and Spieker, 2003a). For example, attachment and
affective social behaviors might be mapped on two indepen-
dent dimensions of anxiety and avoidance (Bartholomew and
Horowitz, 1991), with the secure style corresponding to both
low anxiety and low avoidance, and the disorganized style to
high traits in both anxiety and avoidance. Thus, it remains to
be clarified whether individual differences in AAS mainly refer
to a true taxonomy of personality traits or to some underlying
mechanisms that might result in distinct patterns of attachment
behaviors. Nevertheless, this issue does not undermine the gen-
eral assumptions of AT (Waters and Beauchaine, 2003), and both
classification schemes seem equally useful for analyzing indi-
vidual differences in attachment security and social interactions
(Fraley and Spieker, 2003b).
Furthermore, some aspects of AAS might partly overlap with
other important psychological dimensions associated with indi-
vidual personality traits, such as neuroticism, reward dependence,
and novelty seeking (Chotai et al., 2005). Hence, it also remains
to be better determined what the specificity of these different
constructs really is. Importantly, functional neuroimaging stud-
ies might help to address this issue, for example by showing that
differences in attachment anxiety and avoidance correlate with
functional modulations in distinct brain systems. Moreover, some
of these effects on brain activity may be specific to attachment
traits and do not correlate with other personality or anxiety mea-
sures (see Vrticˇka et al., 2008; Vrticka et al., 2012a). Yet, as we
describe below, we are only just beginning to unveil the cerebral
architecture of various components that are potentially at play in
the emotional and behavioral features of AAS.
ATTACHMENT-RELATED EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR AND
COGNITION
The influence of individual differences in attachment style on
emotion processing and social cognition has been extensively
demonstrated in a wide range of behavioral experiments. The
latter have generally examined how attachment style, alone
or combined with tasks activating cognitive representations of
attachment, may influence performance in vigilance, attentional
monitoring, perceptual judgment, or memory for verbal material
or emotional facial expressions. These effects illustrate the vari-
eties of mental functions that are potentially modulated as a func-
tion of individual differences in AAS. Although the corresponding
neural substrates are generally unknown, these behavioral effects
provide an important cornerstone to identify processing stages
influenced by attachment style, and to guide neurobiological
investigations with brain imaging or other means. Below we
briefly summarize behavioral findings related to different cogni-
tive and affective domains, in order to provide a comprehensive
overview of the field, but in subsequent sections concerning brain
systems our review will more specifically focus on emotional and
social domains.
ATTACHMENT EFFECTS ON EMOTION PROCESSING
Since attachment style is thought to influence individual
responses to social affective cues, emotion processing has been
explored in various task conditions, for different kinds of stim-
uli. A few studies examined the processing of emotional facial
expressions in a movie morph paradigm (Niedenthal et al., 2002;
Fraley et al., 2006), in which faces could change from neutral to
happy, sad, or angry, and vice versa. The results showed that the
detection of both the onset and offset of all emotional expressions
was reported earlier by people with insecure attachment (anxiety,
avoidance, or more general attachment insecurity). Remarkably,
faces were from unknown people in these experiments, indicating
that AAS can have profound influences on emotional appraisals
even for unfamiliar social material during simple perceptual
tasks.
Another investigation of emotion perception looked at more
controlled processes by asking participants to make explicit rat-
ings of pleasantness and arousal for video-clips with attachment-
related content (Rognoni et al., 2008). The results showed that
anxiously attached individuals rated negative emotions of fear
and sadness as more arousing, as compared with secure indi-
viduals, whereas avoidantly attached participants rated positive
emotions as less arousing. These findings are consistent with
theoretical proposals postulating an enhanced responsiveness to
negative social cues associated with anxious attachment, and
a dismissal of positive interactions associated with avoidance.
Similarly, in a recent behavioral experiment carried out in our
own laboratory (Vrticka et al., 2012b), participants were asked to
explicitly rate visual images depicting either positive or negative,
and either social or nonsocial, scenes along scales of pleasantness,
arousal, and control. Again, attachment avoidance was associ-
ated with a selective decrease of pleasantness ratings but only for
positive social scenarios, whereas attachment anxiety was associ-
ated with both increased arousal and decreased control ratings
for negative social scenarios specifically. These data underscore
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the selective impact of AAS on affective responses to social cues,
rather than on more general emotional information.
ATTACHMENT EFFECTS ON SELECTIVE ATTENTION
In addition to emotion, several studies examined how infor-
mation processing may be biased by personal representations
of attachment. For example, some studies showed that anx-
iously attached participants are faster to make lexical decisions
in response to the names of their attachment figures (Mikulincer
et al., 2002), and display a selective hypervigilance toward attach-
ment names (Dewitte et al., 2007a,b). Likewise, attachment style
can affect attention in a Stroop task when it is performed fol-
lowing exposure to threat- versus neutral-word primes (i.e.,
Mikulincer et al., 2002) or attachment-related versus -unrelated
words (i.e., Edelstein, 2006). In one of these studies (Mikulincer
et al., 2002), the Stroop task was made of names of attachment
figures and measured their degree of accessibility (by naming
latencies) in threatening and nonthreatening contexts. Response
times were slower in anxiously attached participants in both the
neutral and threat prime conditions, but faster in avoidantly
attached participants specifically after presentation of the threat-
word primes. These data were taken to suggest that attachment
anxiety leads to a heightened processing of attachment-related
information in general, whereas attachment avoidance entails
opposite effects (i.e., suppression of processing) during negative
contexts specifically. Another study (Edelstein, 2006) confirmed
these findings for avoidant attachment style by showing that
emotional Stroop interference is reduced for attachment-related
words. This study also revealed that such inhibition of attention
to potentially threatening information requires cognitive effort
because it was attenuated under conditions with simultaneous
increase in cognitive load.
Other experiments tested for attention effects by using a dot-
probe task in which participants were presented with either
pairs of positive or negative attachment-related or attachment-
unrelated words (Dewitte et al., 2007b), or pairs of different
kinds of known or unknown names (Dewitte et al., 2007a). The
results revealed that both avoidantly and anxiously attached indi-
viduals were characterized by preferential orienting of attention
away from negative attachment-related words, relative to secure
individuals. In addition, anxious attachment was also associated
with an attentional bias toward positive and negative attachment-
related (versus attachment-unrelated) names (Mikulincer and
Shaver, 2007). Taken together, such findings suggest that negative
attachment-related information might be feared in case of highly
anxious and/or highly avoidant attachment traits, but only attach-
ment anxiety to lead to an enhanced representation of attachment
signals under threatening circumstances.
ATTACHMENT EFFECTS ON MEMORY
A third line of studies examining the impact of attachment
style on cognition has focused on memory processes, using
forced-choice recall of emotionally-laden drawings (Kirsh, 1996),
free recall for positive, neutral, or threatening words (Van
Emmichoven et al., 2003), as well as an operation-word span task
including neutral, emotional, and attachment related words dur-
ing working memory performance (Edelstein, 2006). The first
of these studies reported that avoidantly attached individuals
remembered depictions of anger better than securely or anxiously
attached participants, whereas the second found better recall for
threatening words in securely attached compared to insecurely
attached participants. In the working memory domain, deficits
were observed in avoidantly attached participants for both pos-
itive and negative attachment-related stimuli (Edelstein, 2006).
The latter findings for working memory performance are highly
consistent with the proposal that avoidant individuals tend to
defensively inhibit the processing of potentially distressing infor-
mation (Edelstein, 2006). However, in contrast, data from the
memory recall tasks are partly divergent and not directly pre-
dicted by AT (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). More research is
therefore needed to clarify the effect of individual attachment
traits on various stages of memory functioning.
Taken together, the existing behavioral findings clearly show
that individual differences in AAS correlate with difference in
a range of cognitive and affective processes, particularly in
attachment-relevant or social contexts. Moreover, these effects
may act on different kinds of functions, operating both at a rather
automatic or implicit (even unconscious) level and at a more vol-
untary or explicit (conscious) levels of processing. However, the
exact neural mechanisms involved in these effects remain largely
unexplored, although general models of social cognition and
emotion processing (Lieberman, 2007) suggest that they should
implicate several distinct brain circuits.
NEUROSCIENCE OF HUMAN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
FROM AN ATTACHMENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE: THE
ROLE OF AUTOMATIC AFFECTIVE APPRAISALS
As mentioned above, the neuroscientific investigation of attach-
ment in humans has just recently begun. To date, only a handful
of studies have probed brain systems activated during social inter-
actions or emotional tasks from anAT perspective, and even fewer
explored the influence of individual differences in secure or inse-
cure AASs. The following sections will provide an overview of
recent findings from these studies, specifically those focusing on
the neural substrates of human attachment as well as those explor-
ing other relevant social functions with a neuroscience approach.
While doing so, we will organize the putative mechanisms modu-
lated by AAS in a general framework (see Figure 1), with distinct
functional components based on both (1) current cognitive and
affective neuroscience models, and (2) modern views on AT.
Specifically, we will distinguish brain systems modulated by indi-
vidual attachment orientations that belong, on the one hand,
to networks associated with basic affective evaluation processes,
such as threat or reward, and on the other hand, networks that
are associated instead with cognitive control and mentalizing
abilities, such as a theory of mind, self-reflection, and emotion
regulation.
SOCIAL APPROACH
Several models of emotion and social cognition (e.g., Phillips
et al., 2003a,b; Lieberman, 2007; LeDoux, 2012) include core
processes subserving rapid or automatic (sometimes even uncon-
scious) processing of information in terms of safety versus dan-
ger, which are intrinsically linked with behavioral tendencies
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FIGURE 1 | Functional neuroanatomical model of the influence of adult
attachment style on social processing. Two core component networks
mediate relatively automatic affective evaluations versus more controlled
cognitive processes, broadly corresponding to emotional versus cognitive
mentalization mechanisms proposed in other models (Fonagy and Luyten,
2009). The affective evaluation component further comprises social approach
(purple) versus aversion (blue) systems, whereas the cognitive control
component comprises distinct systems implicated in emotion regulation
(orange) and mental state representation (red). We assume “push-pull”
effects between approach versus aversion modules (green arrow), which
might be jointly influenced by learning as well as genetic factors (e.g.,
neuromodulator systems listed in the gray box). In addition, more complex
reciprocal influence may exist between the affective evaluation and cognitive
control components (turquoise arrows). The possible influence of attachment
avoidance (AV) or anxiety (AX) on activity of each of these networks is
depicted by (downward or upward) arrows (red boxes) representing relative
hypo- or hyper-activation, respectively. For details, please refer to text.
(DL)PFC = (dorsolateral) prefrontal cortex; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex;
(p)STS = (posterior) superior temporal sulcus; TPJ = temporo-parietal
junction; aSTG = anterior superior temporal gyrus.
to either approach or avoid a stimulus. Automatic appraisals
of danger and safety may thus also apply to socially relevant
cues, and guide adaptive behaviors in a quasi “reflexive” man-
ner. This concept draws upon the phylogenetic perspective of
social engagement and attachment proposed by Porges (Porges,
2003). This author suggested that in order to achieve proso-
cial ends, evolution had to counterbalance the asocial tendencies
of more primitive survival-enhancing systems, especially sympa-
thetic fight-or-flight circuits. In other words, there might be a
dynamic balance, or a “push-pull” mechanism, between activ-
ity in a threat-sensitive system motivating social aversion, on
the one hand, and an attachment system that promotes a sense
of safety through close social interactions, on the other hand
(for a summary, see MacDonald and MacDonald, 2011). Both
the social approach and aversion components might poten-
tially be modulated by differences in attachment style (see
Figure 1).
In this perspective, a fundamental hypothesis about the social
approach component is that it might build upon specific brain
mechanisms related to the “neuroception of safety” (Porges, 2003),
which assumes that (mutual) social interactions are innately
rewarding and thus counteracting fear tendencies. Such a view
converges with research associating activations in dopaminer-
gic brain areas [including the ventral tegmental area, substantia
nigra, striatum, and medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)] with
many different kinds of positive social emotions, as well as with
the modulations of fear-circuits in the amygdala by dopamin-
ergic inputs (Haber and Knutson, 2010). There is mounting
evidence for a role of reward circuits and reinforcing processes
in social approach and bonding from several recent functional
and structural brain imaging investigations on maternal and
romantic love (Lorberbaum et al., 1999; Nitschke et al., 2004;
Ranote et al., 2004; Aron et al., 2005; Fisher et al., 2005, 2006;
Gobbini and Haxby, 2007; Sander et al., 2007; Swain et al.,
2007; Zeki, 2007; Noriuchi et al., 2008; Strathearn et al., 2008;
Lenzi et al., 2009; Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009; Kim et al.,
2010a,b, 2011; Xu et al., 2011), the perception of the mother’s
face in children (Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009), as well as the
experience of social reward (e.g., a smiling face paired with pos-
itive feedback after correct task performance) over and above
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positive feedback alone (Vrticˇka et al., 2008). Altogether, these
data suggest that, under normal circumstances, social interac-
tions with beloved ones (children, parents, partners), friends,
or any “significant” (e.g., contextually relevant) other person
with a cooperative relationship (e.g., joint task), are all asso-
ciated with the experience of positive emotions and increased
activity in the reward circuits. This could contribute to promot-
ing expectations of positive social outcomes, and thus in turn
enhance approach-related attachment behaviors and a feeling of
safety.
The recruitment of this positive reinforcement mechanism has
been found to be strongly influenced by individual differences in
AAS. On the one hand, individuals with a secure attachment style
(or other measures indirectly suggesting a secure attachment ori-
entation) were observed to show stronger activation, or display
increased gray matter volume, in the reward network as well as
other interconnected regions such as the hypothalamus or OFC.
For instance, the ventral striatum differentially activates in secure
mothers seeing images of their own babies with a smiling or a
crying facial expression (Strathearn et al., 2009). Also, in mothers
who score higher on the mother positive perception subscale of
the Yale inventory of parental thoughts and actions, there is not
only increased gray matter volume, but also more activity in OFC
in response to infant cries (Kim et al., 2010a). Likewise, activity
in ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area is greater in secure
than insecure individuals when receiving positive social feedback
(praise by others) after a correct performance in a perceptual
game (Vrticˇka et al., 2008). Thus, in securely attached individuals,
(mutual) social interactions indeed seem generally to be associ-
ated with more positive emotion experiences and stronger signals
of reward.
On the other hand, these positive responses are much weaker
or even absent in individuals with an avoidant attachment style.
This was first demonstrated in a recent study (Vrticˇka et al.,
2008) where different faces were presented with different expres-
sions (smiling or angry) to convey either positive/supportive
or negative/hostile feedback about current task performance in
a pseudo-interactive game context (see Figure 2A). Differential
responses in ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area to the
social nature of feedback (smiling face versus angry faces on
winning trials) was inversely correlated with increasing scores
on the avoidant attachment dimension (Vrticˇka et al., 2008;
see Figure 2B). This pattern is further supported by the find-
ings of very low ventral striatum and medial OFC activation in
avoidantly versus securely attached mothers when seeing images
of their own babies (Strathearn et al., 2009). An avoidant attach-
ment style, which is thought to emerge due to early and/or
repeated social interactions with an unresponsive attachment fig-
ure, and characterized by a negative model of others (Mikulincer
and Shaver, 2007), therefore seems to entail a profound change in
the social approach system (see Figure 1), leading to a reduction
or lack of reward-related activity during positive social situations.
It still remains to be determined whether such blunted responses
in reward-related areas associated with avoidant attachment are
primarily due to past experiences and learning mechanisms (so
to speak as a result of down-regulation or desensitization), or
whether they also have a partly genetic cause (i.e., receptor-gene
polymorphisms, reduction of certain neurotransmitters, etc.),
or whether they emerge as a combination of these two factors
through gene-environment interactions (see below).
These neural findings dovetail nicely with behavioral evidence
that avoidant individuals rate positive social information as less
arousing and less pleasant, relative to securely attached individ-
uals (Rognoni et al., 2008; Vrticka et al., 2012a). More generally,
they also agree with some key assumptions put forward by AT,
according to which avoidance is associated with the use of deac-
tivating strategies to keep the attachment system in a very low
recruitment state, although behavioral research has most often
considered these effects in relation to the processing of nega-
tive rather than positive (social) content (Mikulincer and Shaver,
2007). The new findings therefore add to previous work by indi-
cating that avoidantly attached people could appraise positive
social interactions with less—or even no—intrinsically rewarding
values, and perhaps fail to learn from positive social reinforcers.
These notions may not only help refine AT but also provide new
clues for therapeutic clinical strategies tailored to treat attachment
disturbances.
By contrast, there is no evidence that anxious attachment style
is associated with a modulation of neural processes related to
social approach (Vrticˇka et al., 2008). As described in the next
section, this attachment dimension seems primarily related to the
appraisals of negative social cues, consistent with the assumptions
of AT (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).
SOCIAL AVERSION
According to the same phylogenetic perspective on social engage-
ment and attachment as described above (Porges, 2003), the
approach system should be in a dynamic balance (“push-pull”)
with a distinct social aversion network (see Figure 1). In humans,
appraisals of potential threats to the self may not only concern
information that poses an immediate danger for survival or bod-
ily integrity—such as physical pain or disgust—but brain systems
responding to such general threats are also recruited when pro-
cessing dangers of a more social kind. Thus, a set of regions
typically associated with negative affect and fear responses are
activated by various aversive social events including—amongst
others—the perception of untrustworthiness of faces in the
amygdala (Engell et al., 2007), stressful social situations in the
hippocampus—as part of the HPA axis—(Foley and Kirschbaum,
2010), psychological pain and social rejection in insula and mid
cingulate cortex (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Lamm et al.,
2011), social emotional conflict in ventral anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) (Somerville et al., 2006; Koban et al., 2010), as
well as the experience of sadness or grief in anterior temporal
pole (ATP; Levesque et al., 2003; Kersting et al., 2009). Thus,
appraisals of negative social contexts will trigger activity in a net-
work of areas promoting aversion, withdrawal, or even defense
responses.
Recent neuroimaging data suggests that both the functioning
and structure of brain areas contributing to this social aver-
sion component is modulated by a secure attachment style (see
Figure 1). In a pioneer study in this field, securely attached mar-
ried female participants (as assessed by the satisfaction subscale
of the dyadic adjustment scale—measuring marital quality) were
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FIGURE 2 | Modulation of social aversion and approach activations
by adult attachment style. Adapted from Vrticˇka et al. (2008).
(A) Participants performed a visual task, while receiving feedback from virtual
partners about their performance. Feedback was composed of words
reflecting outcome (“Won” if correct and “Lost” if incorrect response was
given), associated with either smiling or angry faces, inducing the perception
of supportive “friends” (congruent word-face combinations) or hostile
“opponents” (incongruent combinations). (B) Top: reward-related areas (left:
ventral striatum; right: ventral tegmental area) were activated during the
perception of positive social feedback (“Won” paired with a smiling face;
SF-W), but this effect was modulated by avoidant attachment style.
Bottom: negative relation between avoidant attachment style (AVS) scores
and the ventral striatum response. (C) Top: the central amygdala was
activated by the perception of social punishment (“Lost” paired with an
angry face; AF-L), and this effect was modulated by anxious attachment style.
Bottom: positive relation between anxious attachment style (AXS)
scores and amygdala response. BOLD signal is depicted in arbitrary
units.
found to show less insula activation during both the antici-
pation and experience of electrical shocks while holding their
partners hand, implying weaker distress reactions and more suc-
cessful emotional support (Coan et al., 2006). Another study
using structural MRI measures reported increases in gray mat-
ter volume in the amygdala in mothers at four months compared
to one month postpartum, and this postpartum plasticity was
correlated with scores on the maternal positive perception sub-
scale of the Yale inventory of parental thoughts and actions
(Kim et al., 2010a). Such findings suggest a progressive develop-
ment of affective vigilance mechanisms in mothers who recently
gave birth, a notion corroborated by previous findings show-
ing highest amygdala activation in mothers for own versus other
familiar or unknown children (Leibenluft et al., 2004). Therefore,
a secure attachment orientation seems to be associated changes
in key structures of the aversion system, presumably reflect-
ing more differentiated and thus adaptive responses to social
stimuli.
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In individuals with avoidant attachment, partly similar effects
have been observed, namely, a relative deactivation of brain areas
associated with social aversion (see Figure 1). In a recent fMRI
study using the cyberball paradigm (a virtual ball tossing game
during which the participant see two people playing with a ball
either including or excluding him/her into the game), which has
previously been found to induce social rejection and “social pain”
(Eisenberger et al., 2003), avoidantly attached individuals showed
decreased activations in the anterior insula and dorsal ACC dur-
ing social exclusion (Dewall et al., 2011). This was interpreted as
reflecting the weaker social need for closeness and weaker distress
elicited by social rejection in these individuals. Along the same
lines, masked sad faces were found to induce weaker responses
in the somatosensory cortex (BA 3) of avoidantly attached par-
ticipants, compared to secure participants, which was attributed
to their “habitual unwillingness to deal with partners’ distress
and needs for proximity” (Suslow et al., 2009). Avoidant attach-
ment has also been related to weaker attentional and seman-
tic processing of fearful faces in an EEG study (Zhang et al.,
2008).
However, contrary to securely attached persons, such blunted
responses to social negative contexts in avoidantly attached indi-
viduals are thought to result from deactivating strategies that
suppress the recruitment of attachment processes in order to
circumvent too strong emotional involvement (Mikulincer and
Shaver, 2007), rather than from a more effective regulation of
emotions during negative or stressful social interactions. This
highlights the fact that emotional decreases in a given brain
area might result from different causes, which might be diffi-
cult to interpret when considered alone. Moreover, an apparent
decreased sensitivity to social rejection in avoidantly attached
individuals may work well under normal circumstances, but
tends to fail if the social emotional stimuli are too disturbing or
intense (i.e., in insecure mothers seeing their baby with a crying
facial expression—see Strathearn et al., 2009), or if the emo-
tion suppression strategy usually referred to cannot be employed
successfully—see Vrticka et al., 2012a and below). In fact, a
different pattern of results, with higher rather than lower amyg-
dala responses to emotional social stimuli, may be observed in
avoidantly attached individuals in some conditions when emo-
tion regulation strategies are constrained by specific task demands
(Vrticka et al., 2012a).
A more consistent and opposite trend is associated with anx-
ious attachment style, where increased activation of the aversion
system has generally been found in response to negative social
cues. In our own study where faces with different expressions
were presented as a social feedback signal about performance
during a perceptual game (Vrticˇka et al., 2008), we showed that
the amygdala was selectively activated when an angry face was
presented as negative feedback after incorrect response (repre-
senting social punishment), and the magnitude of this response
was correlated with the degree of anxious attachment in par-
ticipants (Figure 2C). Such increase in amygdala activation is
likely to reflect the tendency of anxiously attached individuals
to experience heightened distress in situations of personal fail-
ure or social disapproval, when social support would be desired
instead. In keeping with this notion, another study reported an
increase of amygdala activity in response to negative sentences
with attachment-related meaning, which was related to individ-
ual attachment insecurity (Lemche et al., 2006). However, the
latter study did not examine the distinct prototypes or dimen-
sions of attachment using standard structured interviews, but
rather inferred general attachment differences (secure or inse-
cure) based on reaction times to the sentences (slow or fast). In
addition, in the study by Dewall et al. using the cyberball game
(Dewall et al., 2011), increased activation was observed in ante-
rior insula and dorsal ACC during social rejection as a function
of anxious attachment style scores, mirroring an increased sensi-
tivity to negative social clues related to social exclusion. Finally,
another fMRI investigation also found an enhanced hippocam-
pus response when listening to own versus unknown baby cries in
mothers who scored low on a maternal care measure (Kim et al.,
2010b), and the same brain area exhibited a reduction in gray
matter volume which (negatively) correlated with anxious attach-
ment scores (Quirin et al., 2010). These data accord with the role
of the hippocampus in stress responses (Foley and Kirschbaum,
2010).
These findings also converge with other, more clinical fMRI
investigations assessing attachment orientations and brain acti-
vation patterns by means of the adult attachment projective
(AAP)—schematic drawings of attachment-related scenes depict-
ing either one or two persons—which distinguishes between a
resolved versus unresolved attachment orientation (Buchheim
et al., 2006, 2008). The latter studies revealed a positive relation
between unresolved attachment and activation in both the amyg-
dala and hippocampus to traumatic AAP images in general, as
well as an increase in ACC activity in BPD patients—who are
considered to have an unresolved attachment style.
In sum, the available data from recent neuroimaging research
points to a higher sensitivity to negative social clues, and
enhanced recruitment of social aversion or threat systems in rela-
tion to anxious attachment, in agreement with previous work
suggesting higher vigilance to social emotional cues and hyper-
activating of secondary attachment-related strategies in these
individuals (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). This also converges
with behavioral findings showing that anxious attachment cor-
relates with higher arousal and lesser control reported for scenes
with negative (sad or threatening) social content (Rognoni et al.,
2008; Vrticka et al., 2012a), and that stressful task conditions
produce abnormal cortisol responses in anxiously attached indi-
viduals, suggesting impaired regulation of the HPA stress system
(Kidd et al., 2011). By contrast, avoidantly attached individ-
uals show normal cortisol responses and are thought to use
de-activating strategies when processing social emotional infor-
mation. Note that, although such individual differences may arise
in some conditions with no direct attachment-related mean-
ing, there is evidence for relatively specific or stronger effects
of AAS on responses to the social significance of events at
both the neural (Vrticˇka et al., 2008; Vrticka et al., 2012a) and
behavioral levels (Vrticka et al., 2012b), indicating that differen-
tial responses observed in social approach or aversion networks
are not merely related to a general modulation of these sys-
tems to any emotional challenge. Taken together, such data add
support to the view that individual differences in attachment
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and social affective behaviors may ultimately result from an
interaction between genetic factors and learning through early
life experiences, but also have extended influences on other
emotional contexts beyond interpersonal relationships, as pos-
tulated by recent developments in AT (Mikulincer and Shaver,
2007).
COGNITIVE VERSUS EMOTIONAL MENTALIZATION
Besides the notion of a basic level of automatic appraisals of safety
versus danger, underlying social approach versus aversion ten-
dencies (Porges, 2003), another important component of social
cognition involves a set of more controlled processes mediat-
ing conscious representations about others, as well as behavioral
regulation and decision making (Lieberman, 2007). In line with
this, Fonagy and Luyten (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009) suggested
to make a basic distinction between two aspects of social pro-
cessing necessary to understand and respond to others, which
they conceptualized as emotional versus cognitive mentalization
processes. According to this distinction, emotional mentaliza-
tion would correspond to the rather automatic, implicit, or even
unconscious processing of externally-focused (physical and vis-
ible) information about others (such as expressions, actions,
etc.), which are also closely related to neurocognitive mechanisms
implicated in “emotional contagion” (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009)
or “empathizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009). Thus, this level of pro-
cessing implies a predominantly affective representation of other
people and events in the world that would correspond to dif-
ferential activation patterns in the social approach and aversion
systems as described above. Consequently, this component of
emotional mentalization globally overlaps with affective evaluation
processes in our model (see Figure 1).
In contrast, distinct brain networks are known to be acti-
vated by more explicit and voluntary levels of social and affec-
tive processing (Lieberman, 2007; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009).
These processes are also preferentially involved in the represen-
tation of internally-focused information about others (such as
mental states, intentions, etc.), and correspond to what Fonagy
and Luyten (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009) referred to as a cog-
nitive mentalization system. The latter is thought to comprise
(mainly but not exclusively) a wide network of areas in the
lateral prefrontal (PFC), OFC, and posterior cingulate cor-
tex (PCC), as well as the precuneus, superior temporal sulcus
(STS), and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), plus specialized sen-
sory regions in superior temporal gyrus, lateral occipital cor-
tex, and fusiform cortex (Lieberman, 2007; Fonagy and Luyten,
2009).
Importantly, there is evidence that activity in these two sys-
tems for emotional evaluation and cognitive mentalization might
also be in a dynamic balance, and that this equilibrium might be
strongly influenced by stress factors (Mayes, 2000, 2006). Thus,
the higher the stress (arousal), urgency, or novelty of a situation,
the more the “switch point” between different modes of pro-
cessing might be shifted toward an activation of the emotional
evaluation system (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). This shift would
correspond to behavioral changes “from flexibility to automaticity,
. . . that is from relatively slow executive functions . . . to faster
and habitual behavior . . . ” (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009; p. 1367).
From an evolutionary perspective, such a shift between processing
modes would normally be adaptive in threatening conditions, as it
can promote immediate and automatic (reflexive) self-protective
reactions. However, in interpersonal settings where cognitive
mentalization is a necessary prerequisite and danger neither vital
nor immediate (Dunbar, 1998), a too strong or exclusive reliance
on affective evaluation might represent an insufficient or inap-
propriate strategy. Crucially, individual differences in AAS might
play a key role in adjusting this balance between cognitive and
emotional mentalization, in addition to modulating the differ-
ential recruitment of approach or aversion tendencies within
the affective system itself. According to this view, an anxious
attachment style would facilitate emotional mentalization due
to a decreased recruitment of cognitive mentalization capaci-
ties, whereas an avoidant attachment style would be associated
with a predominant use of cognitive mentalization and a sup-
pression of emotional evaluation, at least until the point where
such de-activating strategies fail and highly emotionally reactions
occur in avoidantly attached individuals (Fonagy and Luyten,
2009).
In this “mentalization-based approach” described by Fonagy
and Luyten (2009), no distinction is made between cognitive
mentalization in terms of theory of mind (the representation of
the internal states of others or oneself) versus cognitive control
of emotions and social behaviors (regulation), in relation to oth-
ers or oneself. However, AT suggests that individual attachment
styles also imply distinct modes of emotion regulation strategies
(Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007), which have no direct relation to
mentalization processes. Moreover, an influential theory of emo-
tion regulation theory (Gross, 1998, 2002) has emphasized differ-
ent types of strategies (e.g., antecedent- and response-focused),
but the latter do not make specific reference to interpersonal
emotion situations. It therefore appears useful to consider neu-
ral networks for theory of mind/mental state representation
and emotion regulation/cognitive control separately, in order to
understand the effects of attachment style on mentalization and
social behaviors.
MENTAL STATE REPRESENTATION
The notion that attachment-related thoughts can modulate brain
systems involved in the representation of others’ mental states has
received some support from pioneer work examining the neu-
ral substrates of romantic love, measuring brain responses to
faces of partners versus friends versus unknown persons (Zeki,
2007). These studies reported consistent deactivations in cor-
tical brain areas known to be involved in theory of mind
(Zeki, 2007), accompanied with increased activity in the affec-
tive evaluation (emotional mentalization) networks (Gobbini
and Haxby, 2007; Lieberman, 2007), supporting the view of
a reciprocal balance between cognitive and emotional mental-
ization processes. Furthermore, mothers viewing infant stimuli
have also been found to exhibit greater activity in superior
medial PFC regions (BA 8, 9, and 10) involved in cognitive
mentalization (Swain et al., 2007), which was interpreted as
reflecting the capacity of these mothers “to orchestrate a new
and increased repertoire of complex interactive behaviors with
infants . . . ” (Kim et al., 2010a; p. 698). Thus, both increases
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and decreases may arise in different parts of the cognitive
mentalization networks. However, still little is known about
whether, and how, these networks might be influenced by spe-
cific adult attachment orientations (e.g., secure or insecure) in
different individuals.
One study relevant to this issue examined gray matter volume
and brain activations to own infant cries in mothers in the early
postpartum period, who were divided into two groups according
to their perceived maternal care scores (Kim et al., 2010b), a mea-
sure reflecting differences along secure versus insecure attachment
dimensions. Not only did the mothers with high perceived mater-
nal care scores display increased gray matter volume in several
areas associated with theory-of-mind, such as the PFC (superior
frontal and orbital gyrus; BA 10 and 47), STS, and fusiform gyrus,
but they also showed increased BOLD signal change in these
areas when hearing baby cries. These results suggest that mothers
with secure attachment traits (high scores on perceived mater-
nal care) might more readily engage in complex social behaviors
involving mentalization and theory of mind when interacting
with children, possibly implying more efficient cognitive pro-
cessing to represent their mental states in terms of intentions
or needs. In turn, this could potentially have beneficial effects
on the emerging attachment styles of the child him/herself (see
below). Conversely, low scores on the perceived maternal scale
reflecting insecure attachment, were associated with increased
hippocampus responses to infant cries in the same mothers. As
the hippocampus is known to play an important role in stress
responses (Foley and Kirschbaum, 2010), this pattern again nicely
reflects the notion of a balance between cognitive mentalization
and emotional evaluation processes. Moreover, it also provides
support to the view that a secure attachment style may facilitate
the access to mental state representations, whereas an insecure
attachment may lead to more emotional mentalizing. However,
no finer distinction between avoidant and anxious attachment
styles was made in this study.
Other researchers (Buchheim et al., 2008) explored brain
responses during exposure to monadic versus dyadic pictures of
the AAP. This study compared healthy individuals with resolved
and unresolved profiles, as well as patients with BPD who typ-
ically exhibit an unresolved attachment orientation, for exam-
ple as a result of traumatic attachment-related experiences in
childhood. The results revealed that only BPD patients—but
not unresolved controls—displayed increased activity in the STS
when exposed to dyadic images of the AAP. Simultaneously, BDP
patients showed strongest reports of affective loss and abuse, rela-
tive to the unresolved controls. Because the STS is a key substrate
of the theory-of-mind network, and BPD patients are known
to show distorted and “hyperanalytical” thinking in attachment
contexts, possibly reflecting enhanced representation to other’s
mental states, this pattern of findings was interpreted as “a neural
indicator of fear-based hypervigilance in attachment relationships
. . . ” in BPD patients (Buchheim et al., 2008; p. 233). These data
therefore indicate that, in some cases, mental state representa-
tions may also be enhanced by attachment insecurity, and that
this might be more strongly associated with hypervigilance linked
to attachment anxiety (fear caused by trauma).Moreover, because
in unresolved BPD patients, increased emotional mentalizing was
also demonstrated by the same study (see above), the notion
of an obligatory “push-pull” between emotional and cognitive
mentalization as proposed by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy
and Luyten, 2009) may not always hold true. It remains to be
seen whether distinct aspects of mental state representations are
differentially modulated by anxious and avoidant attachment
traits. In particular, some theorists (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007)
have proposed that anxious and avoidant attachment dimensions
might correspond to different access to positive and negative rep-
resentations of others (as well as of the self). Preliminary data
from our own ongoing work provide tentative support to these
models.
In sum, the emerging evidence from neuroscience research
regarding the impact of individual differences in AAS on mental
state representation seems to suggest that an insecure attach-
ment orientation may not always lead to decreased use theory
of mind and controlled appraisals of mental states in others,
but could also have inverse effects, particularly in the case of
attachment anxiety (hypervigilance). This somewhat contradicts
the hypothesis put forward by the developmental mentalization-
based approach of Fonagy and Luyten (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009),
and their proposal that attachment insecurity observed in BPD
patients reflect a lower cognitive mentalization combined with
higher emotional mentalization. However, as BPD is mainly asso-
ciated with an unresolved attachment orientation, whereas both
anxious and avoidant attachment actually fall into a resolved
category, a strict opposition between cognitive and emotional
mentalization should be regarded with caution when using it
from a psychological perspective in healthy people (adults), rather
than in a psychopathological context like BPD. This apparent dis-
crepancy might also be explained by the fact that Fonagy and
Luyten (2009) considered a single social cognitive system for con-
trolled mentalization, whereas a more complete push-pull model
should regard theory of mind and emotion regulation as separate
components of cognitive mentalization processes, and the latter
might be more strongly influenced by attachment insecurities in
different directions (see next section below). More research using
a neuroscientific approach is still needed to clarify these issues,
particularly regarding attachment avoidance, which is conceptu-
alized as involving increased cognitive mentalizing up to a certain
“breakdown threshold”.
EMOTION REGULATION
Attachment theory assumes that a key component of individual
differences in attachment styles involves distinct affective regula-
tion strategies leading to hyper- or hypo-activation of attachment
system in anxious and avoidant people, respectively. The relation
of these regulation strategies to other mechanisms of emotion
regulation is still incompletely elucidated, however. Both the
cognitive mechanisms and the neural substrates of emotion reg-
ulation have been extensively investigated in the past decade
(Gross, 1998, 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005), but in condi-
tions totally unrelated to attachment. In fact, most of this work
has focused on emotion experience at the intrapersonal level
rather than in interpersonal or social contexts. Traditionally, a
main distinction has been made between so-called antecedent-
and response-focused emotion regulation strategies. The former
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aims at interfering early with the emotion generation process,
before the emotional response arises, through distraction from an
emotional event or modulation of its meaning by extrinsic infor-
mation. The second type of regulation instead is characterized
by a reaction to an already elicited emotion, implying voluntary
control of subsequent behavior. Another important difference
between these two forms of regulation concerns the underlying
mechanisms. Antecedent-focused emotion regulation is thought
to operate either through attentional processes (i.e., avoiding
exposure to the emotion-eliciting stimulus using distraction tech-
niques, etc.), or cognitive re-appraisal strategies (i.e., changing the
interpretation of the stimulus and/or minimizing its emotional
significance). Hence, these emotion regulation strategies are gen-
erally referred to as distraction, detachment, or reappraisal. By
contrast, response-focused emotion regulation involves the (vol-
untary) inhibition or transformation of the emotional response
or behavior after an emotion has ben generated (e.g., facial
expression or physiological changes). This strategy is therefore
generally referred to as (expressive) suppression. In terms of brain
activity patterns, the employment of both emotion regulation
strategies has been linked with increased PFC cortical activation
related to executive control and/or behavioral inhibition (parts of
the cognitive mentalization network), and a simultaneous mod-
ulation (e.g., reduction) of responses evoked in the emotional
evaluation system (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004b; Ochsner and
Gross, 2005; Kim and Hamann, 2007; McRae et al., 2010; Vrticka
et al., 2011). In addition, there is a general consensus that, on
the long term, antecedent-focused emotion regulation may repre-
sent a more beneficial emotion regulation strategy (Gross, 1998,
2002).
Attachment theory makes several claims about the efficiency
as well as the preferential use of different emotion regulation
strategies. On the one hand, secure attachment is associated
with a constructive and thus successful use of antecedent-focused
emotion regulation, mainly by means of cognitive re-appraisal,
leading to a low and stable emotional responsiveness in stress-
ful social situations. On the other hand, insecure attachment is
generally associated with difficulties in emotion regulation capac-
ities, leading to poor outcomes in stressful social situations and
persisting high emotionality. In particular, attachment avoidance
may lead to preferential use of response-focused emotion regu-
lation through suppression, which can reduce overt emotional
reactions, but is not very efficient in regulating emotion elici-
tation itself. Moreover, suppression may work up to a certain
point only, after which this protective mechanism will break down
and avoidantly attached people become overwhelmed by their
emotions. In contrast, attachment anxiety has not been associ-
ated with consistent patterns according to the classic emotion
regulation framework (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). Although
social emotional hypervigilance typically observed in anxiously
attached individual might be driven by a persistent cognitive
up-regulation of affective processing through re-appraisal, and/or
some deficiency in inverse mechanisms aiming at decreasing
emotional reactivity, the exact functioning of these processes
and their modulation by attachment anxiety remains to be
elucidated (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007; Fonagy and Luyten,
2009).
Recent neuroimaging investigations have provided new sup-
port to the notion that attachment insecurities are generally asso-
ciated with less efficient or even disturbed emotion regulation
capacities. In a first study of this kind, Coan et al. (Coan et al.,
2006) scanned female participants while holding their husband’s
hand and being threatened with electrical shocks. They found
that the higher the marital quality reported by the participants
(reflecting a secure attachment in current romantic relationship),
the less activity in PFC cortical areas as well as anterior insula and
hypothalamus there was during shock anticipation, suggesting
more efficient emotion regulation capacities. Conversely, another
study using items of the AAP as visual stimuli (Buchheim et al.,
2006) found that only participants with unresolved attachment
displayed increased activation in lateral PFC areas plus amyg-
dala and hippocampus as a function of increasing traumatic
image content, reflecting impaired emotion regulation capacities.
Finally, a third study used an emotion-word Stroop task dur-
ing which participants had to indicate the color of unpleasant,
neutral, or pleasant words while ignoring their meaning (Warren
et al., 2010). The results revealed that an insecure attachment style
was associated with poor task performance and simultaneously
high activity in both dorsolateral PFC and OFC, again pointing to
less efficient cognitive control capacities—here more specifically
linked with a vulnerability to distraction by attachment-relevant
emotional information.
Other investigations focused on the distinction between dif-
ferent insecure attachment orientations. An early study by Gillath
and colleagues (Gillath et al., 2005) used fMRI in participants
who were told to either think or stop thinking about negative rela-
tionship scenarios. Their findings revealed that anxiously attached
participants exhibited increased activity in the ATP, hippocampus,
and dorsal ACC when thinking about negative emotions, but less
activity in the OFC when suppressing such thoughts. Moreover,
activity in ATP and OFC was inversely correlated. This suggests
a stronger recruitment of neural systems involved in negative
emotional states during normal processing of attachment-related
information, and impaired regulatory capacities to inhibit such
processing, consistent with the hallmarks of anxious attachment.
Conversely, high scores on avoidant attachment were associated
with sustained activity in subcallosal cingulate and medial frontal
gyrus (BA 9) during both the “think” and the “don’t think”
conditions, which was interpreted as a failure of “task-induced
deactivation” (Gillath et al., 2005)—but could actually also be
understood as persistent unsuccessful inhibition. However, these
results provide only indirect evidence for altered emotion regula-
tion capacities in attachment anxiety and avoidance.
We recently extended these findings by specifically compar-
ing the effect of both reappraisal and suppression strategies
within the same fMRI experiment (Vrticka et al., 2012a). For
this purpose, participants were shown social or nonsocial visual
scenes, with either a positive or negative content, while being
asked to either attend to the scenes naturally (NAT), reap-
praise their content to diminish any emotional interpretation
(REAP), or suppress any visible expression of emotion elicited
by the images (ESUP). Distinct patterns of activations were
observed as a function of the degree of attachment avoidance or
anxiety, but interestingly, the most important differences were
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disclosed during the spontaneous emotion processing condi-
tion (NAT). When participants were instructed not to use any
regulation strategy, higher scores on avoidant attachment were
associated with increased activity for negative social scenes in
dorsal and ventral anterior cingulate, as well as in both the lat-
eral and medial dorsal PFC, but for positive social scenes in
the medial OFC and supplemental motor area (SMA). This pat-
tern may reflect heightened cognitive and emotional conflict in
combination with increased regulatory inhibition during sponta-
neous viewing of social emotional scenes. Furthermore, during
REAP, amygdala activation to negative social images decreased
for low, but not high avoidantly attached participants, implying
that this emotion regulation strategy was not efficient in reduc-
ing affective mentalizing (Figures 3A,B,C). Finally, during SUP,
attachment avoidance was associated with stronger responses to
positive social images in the SMA and caudate, again implying
stronger regulatory efforts with the successful use of suppres-
sion. As a whole, these brain imaging data support but also
extend the notion put forward by AT (Mikulincer and Shaver,
2007) that attachment avoidance is associated with a prefer-
ential use of emotion suppression in interpersonal/social con-
texts. Furthermore, they reveal that reappraisal may not work
for these individuals, leading to impaired down-regulation of
amygdala reactivity. This pattern may help understand why
avoidantly attached individuals tend to become highly emo-
tional when their preferred regulation strategies fail or cannot be
employed.
Conversely, in the same study, higher scores on attachment
anxiety were correlated with higher amygdala activation to social
negative scenes during spontaneous viewing without specific reg-
ulation instructions (NAT; Figures 3D,E,F), confirming the pre-
vious proposals of heightened emotional mentalizing. However,
there was no additional evidence of impaired emotion regula-
tion, neither during REAP, nor during SUP. Moreover, we also
found that anxious attachment predicted greater activation in
the parahippocampal cortex (during NAT and REAP), suggesting
that it might ease the access to memory about previous attach-
ment experiences, as already proposed in a previous study (Gillath
et al., 2005). Although no final conclusions can be drawn from
such results, our data nonetheless imply that anxiously attached
individuals can successfully apply both antecedent- and response-
focused emotion regulation strategies when properly instructed
to do so, and that the increased emotional mentalization in
spontaneous conditions could partly be accompanied with an
eased access to memory information, for example about former
personal attachment experiences.
FIGURE 3 | Modulation of social emotion perception and regulation by
adult attachment style. Adapted from Vrticka et al. (2012a). (A) Bilateral
amygdala activation to social (versus nonsocial) emotional scenes perception,
regardless of valence (positive or negative) and task. (B) Positive correlation
between avoidant attachment (AV) scores and activity in left amygdala for
social negative images during reappraisal (averaged across voxels).
(C) Median split illustrating data for high (red; N = 5) versus low (blue; N = 8)
avoidantly attached participants in left amygdala, showing a decrease in
activity to social negative images during reappraisal for the low but not high
avoidant group (∗∗ indicate the differential response accounting for significant
effects in the correlation analysis). (D) Right amygdala activation to negative
scenes showing a significant modulation by anxious attachment (AX) scores
during natural viewing conditions. (E) Negative correlation between anxious
attachment scores and response to nonsocial negative scenes in the right
amygdala. (F) Median split illustrating data for high (red; N = 8) versus low
(blue; N = 9) anxiously attached participants in right amygdala, showing that
activation to negative scenes was greater for nonsocial content in those with
lower AX scores, but greater for social content in those with higher AX
scores. (∗∗ indicate the differential response accounting for significant effects
in the whole-brain correlation analysis). NAT = natural viewing, REAP =
reappraisal, ESUP = expressive suppression. BOLD signal is depicted in
arbitrary units, and error bars represent +/− 1 standard error from mean.
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Overall, these neuroscientific data on emotion regulation con-
verge with theoretical assumptions that have generally character-
ized attachment insecurities by altered or less efficient cognitive
control capacities (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007), leading in turn
to enhanced emotional responses. Furthermore, these new find-
ings also indicate that the underlying mechanisms may differ in
avoidantly and anxiously attached individuals, particularly with
respect to the use and/or efficacy of antecedent- or response-
focused emotion regulation strategies. However, although extant
data have begun to characterize these individual differences in
relation to a well-established model of emotion regulation (e.g.,
making a key distinction between reappraisal and suppression),
it remains to be determined whether more specific regulation
strategies are differentially modulated by individual attachment
orientations—beyond the traditional strategies studied in healthy
people (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004a; Kim and Hamann, 2007;
McRae et al., 2010; Kanske et al., 2011; Vrticka et al., 2012a).
These issues should be investigated in more detail in the future,
because they could prove of great importance to develop and
monitor intervention strategies of attachment insecurities and
their associated regulation deficits.
MOLECULAR AND GENETIC MECHANISMS
As mentioned in the introduction, some investigations on the
neurobiological underpinning of (human) social behavior have
begun to explore the molecular and genetic mechanisms at play
in social affective processing, learning, and bonding (Insel and
Young, 2001; Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008; Heinrichs et al., 2009;
Champagne, 2010; Insel, 2010; Bakermans-Kranenburg and van
Ijzendoorn, 2011; MacDonald and MacDonald, 2011), as well
as those implicated in disorders such as autism, sociopathy, or
aggression (Piggot et al., 2009; Koenigs et al., 2011; Soyka, 2011).
Within this new field of research, several studies have recently
focused on specific questions related to individual differences in
attachment style (Gillath et al., 2008; Salo et al., 2008; Costa
et al., 2009; Bradley et al., 2011; Troisi et al., 2011). For exam-
ple, there is emerging evidence that some aspects of attachment
are transmitted across generations (Hautamaki et al., 2010; Shah
et al., 2010), and that genetic polymorphisms related to emo-
tions and social behavior might influence individual responses
to attachment-related experiences during development (Gillath
et al., 2008). In particular, anxious attachment has been found to
correlate with a polymorphism of the DRD2 dopamine receptor
gene, whereas avoidant attachment is associated with a polymor-
phism of the 5HT2A serotonin receptor gene. By contrast, no
relation was found between attachment insecurities and a poly-
morphism of the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene (Gillath et al.,
2008), even though the latter has been associated with other indi-
vidual differences in social behavior (Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008).
Future studies will also have to examine possible epigenetic
mechanisms, looking for particular gene-environment interac-
tions which can be induced by early life experiences (Graeff et al.,
2011). Possible candidate genes comprise, among others, oxy-
tocin, vasopressin, dopamine, the opioids, cortisol, and serotonin
(see Figure 1).
Two recent fMRI studies have also described an association
between amygdala activations during the perception of emotional
facial expressions and OXTR and vasopressin (Avpr1a) receptor-
gene polymorphisms, which even correlated with individual mea-
sures of emotional reactivity and prosocial temperament in one
study (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2009; Tost et al., 2010). Future
experiments should employ more specific social emotional tasks
and probe for modulations by more specific personality traits,
including in particular individual differences in attachment style.
The effects of genetic or epigenetic factors on distinct neural cir-
cuits mediating attachment processes and their impact on social
cognition (as depicted in Figure 1) should also be systematically
examined.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The present paper proposes an overview of the human brain sys-
tems underlying individual differences in AAS, and how they
influence social and emotional processing in healthy individ-
uals. It employs a developmental psychological AT perspective
and integrates these notions in a schematic functional architec-
ture derived from current neuroscience models, with two major
components for affective and cognitive representations, respec-
tively. This framework suggests that early interactions between
children and their main attachment figure as well as subsequent
social experiences, perhaps combined with some genetic factors,
will become integral parts of one’s personal schemas guiding
relationships with others in later life, resulting in profound indi-
vidual differences characterized by secure or insecure (avoidant,
anxious, disorganized/unresolved) attachment. Such personality
traits will produce important and long-lasting influences on social
emotional information processing and regulation, associated with
differential recruitment of specific functional brain networks for
understanding and responding to others in close (or at times less
close) relationships.
We propose a functional neuroanatomical model to describe
such interactions, which builds on two main core components.
These comprise, on the one hand, a system for rapid, automatic
affective appraisals (emotional mentalization), which is primar-
ily involved in encoding basic dimensions of safety versus threat,
or approach versus aversion tendencies in social contexts; and
on the other hand, a system for controlled social processing and
regulation (cognitive mentalization), operating in a more con-
scious, voluntary mode, which is involved in representing the
mental states of others (theory of mind) and regulating one’s own
behavior, thoughts, and emotions. These two functional compo-
nents rely on distinct brain networks (Porges, 2003; Lieberman,
2007; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009), essentially centered on limbic
cortico-subcortical areas (e.g., amygdala, striatum, insula, cingu-
late, hippocampus) for affective evaluations, and fronto-temporal
areas (e.g., MPFC, OFC, STS, TPJ, etc.) for cognitive mental-
ization and regulation, respectively. Importantly, these compo-
nents may entertain a reciprocal dynamic balance between each
other. Moreover, their differential recruitment across individuals
in social contexts allow for a distinction between behaviors and
emotions associated with specific attachment orientations (avoid-
ance or anxiety), rather than just a distinction between secure
versus insecure or disorganized/unresolved attachment.
According to this model, an avoidant attachment style is char-
acterized by blunted responses in both subparts of the emotional
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mentalizing systems (signaling social safety or threat), reflecting
a deactivation of attachment needs. Findings regarding mental
state representation specifically related to attachment avoidance
are still preliminary and need further confirmation. Yet, avoidant
attachment style also appears to imply a distinctive pattern of
emotion regulation strategies, with greater reliance on suppres-
sion but difficulties in using reappraisal (antecedent-focused
regulation) to dampen affective appraisals.
In contrast, an anxious attachment style is associated with
enhanced responses to social emotional information signaling
threat and motivating aversion, mirroring the hyperactivation of
attachment needs and subjective lack of control observed behav-
iorally. This might also be combined with enhanced recruitment
of mental state attribution systems in some situations related
to fear (trauma in BPD patients). However, emotion regulation
appears relatively operational when explicitly required by task
instructions, although mingled with greater recruitment of asso-
ciative memory systems that may promote access to memories of
previous attachment contexts.
This research highlights the fact that social interactions and
emotions therein are susceptible to strong modulations by indi-
vidual differences, reflecting (among others) the key role of the
attachment history of a person as well as possible neurobiological
predisposition factors. Such consideration of individual attach-
ment style and history in recent neuroimaging studies appears
critical to extend social and affective neuroscience research to
a comprehensive and valid framework of socially motivated
behaviors, although there still is a lack of experimental inves-
tigations of these effects in more complex and “true” social
interactions. Future studies should therefore aim at better assess-
ing attachment effects on brain responses during “real” social
encounters, or at least in laboratory context resembling the lat-
ter as closely as possible, as for example by employing func-
tional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) in two participants
at the same time, also referred as to hyperscanning (Cui et al.,
2012).
In addition, despite the fact that most attachment effects
described in this review concern healthy non-clinical popula-
tions, they also have implications for promoting well-being and
reducing social stress, and may in addition provide useful clues
regarding attachment system dysregulations in patients with psy-
chopathologies or abnormal social behaviors (Galynker et al.,
2011; Nolte et al., 2011). Future investigations need to deepen
our knowledge of the neural mechanisms involved in different
facets of attachment, its development (brain activation patterns
related to attachment in childhood and adolescence and their
transition into adulthood) and its malleability by new experi-
ences and learning, including at the level of gene-environment
interactions. We believe that this endeavor will be made possible
by using an interdisciplinary approach based on neuroimag-
ing, genetic, and psychological investigations in humans, as well
as innovative studies on animal models of social behaviors, as
effectively illustrated by many recent advances in social neuro-
science.
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